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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent's Brief raises two new issues. These are 
the issue of estoppel and waiver (treated in Point III of 
Respondent's Brief); and whether the plaintiff can recover 
for the damages sustained within 90 days previous to the 
filing of his claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(as treated in Point IV of the Respondent's Brief). 
This Reply Brief treats only these new issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE. SALT LAKE COUNTY IS NOT 
ESTOPPED TO ASSERT THE PROVISIONS OF 
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
This Court has considered the issue of estoppel for the 
governmental entity to assert as a defense the provisions of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act on four occasions. These 
cases, taken together, clearly define the law on the issue 
of estoppel. The first of the cases decided was Rice v. Granite 
Schaar District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). In 
that case plaintiff was injured when she fell from a wooden 
bleacher which was maintained by the defendant school district. 
Immediately following her accident she filed a notice of 
claim with the authorities of the high school. Shortly 
thereafter, she was contacted by the school district's 
insurance adjuster, who advised her that she would be corn-
pensated for her damages as soon as the costs thereof were 
ascertained and she was released by her doctor. During the 
next several months she was again contacted by the insurance 
adjuster, who reassured her that the insurance company would 
accept responsibility. 
Finally, after the time for filing suit had expired, 
the insurance company informed the plaintiff that her claim 
had been denied. Under these facts this Court reversed a 
.Summary Judgment on behalf of the school district and held 
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
-2-
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the school district should be estopped from asserting the 
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. So holding, 
the court said: 
~e cannot justly or equitably lull an adver-
~ary.~nto.a fal~e sense of security, thereby sub-
]ect~ng h~s cla~ to the bar of limitations, and 
then be heard to plead that very delay as a defense 
to the action when brought. Acts or conduct which 
wrongfully induce a party to believe an amicable 
adjustment of his claim will be made may create an 
estoppel against pleading the statute of limitations. 
23 Utah 2d at 28, 456 P.2d at 163. 
The second of these cases is Varoz v. Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 
158, 506 P.2d 436 (1973). In that case the plaintiff's 
decedent was killed in an automobile accident which allegedly 
resulted from inadequate warning signs. Shortly after the 
accident, the plaintiff's attorney contacted Salt Lake 
County and was erroneously told that the section of the road 
in question was maintained by the Utah State Highway Depart-
ment. Acting on this information, the plaintiff's attorney 
filed a notice of claim with the State of Utah. After the 
claim was denied by the State of Utah on the basis that the 
section of road was actually maintained by Salt Lake County, 
the plaintiff's attorney filed notice of claim with Salt 
Lake County, but by that time the 90 day period for filing 
had expired. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss 
and this court affirmed, holding that the legislature intended 
to make the filing of a timely notice of claim prerequisite 
to maintaining an action against a governmental entity. The 
-3-
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court also impliedly held that there was no waiver or es-
toppel to assert the provisions of the Governmental Immunity 
Act in that case. 
In Whitaker v. Salt Lake City, 522 P.2d 1252 (Utah 
1974), the plaintiff was injured in a cave-in on a hillside 
adjacent to a park owned and maintained by Salt Lake City. 
In this case, like Rice, the notice of claim was filed 
within the prescribed time, but the plaintiff's attorney 
failed to file the ~uit because the city's attorney had 
assured him that there would be a settlement within the 
policy limits and thereby lulled him into believing that no 
suit need be filed. This court held that these allegations 
created a sufficient question of fact to require submission 
of the estoppel issue to the jury. 
The final case in this series is Scarborough v. Granite 
School District, 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). In Scarborough, 
the minor plaintiff was injured on a school ground as a 
result of dead electrical wires which had been left dangling 
from the poles. The principal was immediately informed of 
the child's injury and the child's parent had a discussion 
with the school principal about the responsibility for the 
accident. The school principal erroneously told the plaintiff's 
mother that the wires had been left in the dangling condition 
by the utility company, Utah Power & Light. 
In reliance. on the information obtained from the school 
-4-
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principal, the plaintiff pursued her claim against Utah 
Power & Light rather than the school district. By the time 
the plaintiff's attorney discovered that school district 
employees, rather than Utah Power & Light, left the wires 
dangling the time for filing a notice of claim with the 
school district had expired. The court discussed the Rice 
case and held as follows: 
There are significant differences between 
this case and that one. There the plaintiff had 
filed a timely written notice with the school 
district. The plaintiff's contention was that 
the insurance adjuster, who was handling the 
matter for the school district, gave the plain-
tiff assurances that the case would be settled 
after the extent of injuries and damages had 
been determined, and that this lulled her into 
a sense of security until after the time for 
filing the suit had expired. 
[I]t is our conclusion that the trial 
court could properly rule as a matter of law 
that because of the plaintiff's failure to file 
a claim in the time allowed by the statute; and 
because there is no basis upon which estoppel 
against the defendant's reliance on the statute 
could be made out, she cannot show entitlement 
to maintain this action. 
These four cases, taken together, clearly establish the 
elements of estoppel under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. In both Rice and Whitaker, where the court held that 
there was submissible issue on the question of estoppel, the 
plaintiff had filed the timely notice with a governmental 
entity but had failed to file the action within the limi-
tation period thereafter. In both Rice and Whitaker, the 
-5-
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plaintiff claimed that a representative of the governmental 
entity had promised that payment would be forthcoming and 
thereby lulled the plaintiff into a false sense of security 
and a belief that filing a lawsuit would not be necessary. 
In Varoz and Scarborough, where the court held that 
there was not a submissible issue of fact on the issue of 
estoppel, the plaintiff had failed to act because of false 
information that it had been supplied by representatives of 
the governmental ~ntity. But in neither of these cases did 
the governmental entity admit liability or tell the plaintiff 
that payment would be forthcoming. 
When a potential defendant denies liability for whatever 
reason, the plaintiff is put on notice that the defendant 
intends to make no payment. The plaintiff knows at that 
point that legal action must be taken. In such an instance 
no estoppel can arise. Of course, if the defendant is 
guilty of fraud or concealment, the time period is tolled 
until discovery of the fraud or concealment. For an estoppel 
to occur, however, the defendant must lull the plaintiff 
into a false sense of security by promising payment or 
admitting liability. 
In this case the evidence is not that Salt Lake Cou~ty 
admitted liability and promised to pay, but that it dis-
claimed liability. At that point, according to the Utah 
cases, the plaintiff is made aware that in order to proceed 
-6-
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further, a formal claim must be made against the govern-
mental entity. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER FOR 
THE DAMAGES OCCURRING IN THE 90 DAYS 
PREVIOUS TO THE FILING OF CLAIM. 
This Court has previously considered the issue of the 
running of the statute of limitations for continuing torts 
or nuisances. Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Central RR., 68 Utah 
309, 249 P. 1036 (1926) was a case very similar to the one 
at bench·in that a continuing nuisance was alleged. The 
railroad had built its tracks near the plaintiff's property, 
causing depreciation to the value of the property. The 
plaintiff claimed that the statute of limitations did not 
run against a continuous nuisance. The court held: 
Where the wrong done by the railroad company 
is temporary in its nature, as in leaving cars 
unnecessarily on its tracks, or while engaged in 
the work of laying down its track, something 
existing today and not tomorrow, fluctuating in 
extent and depending on the ever-repeated action 
of the company, only such damages as have fully 
accrued prior to the commencement of the suit 
are recoverable, and none based upon any presumed 
continuance or repetition of the wrong. But where 
the wrong is of a permanent nature and springs 
from the manner in which the track, as fully com-
pleted, affects approach to the lot, then, not-
withstanding the right which the State retains 
to control the manner of use of the highway or 
a railroad company, even if deemed necessary to 
compel an entire removal of its track, the lot 
owner may treat the act of the company as a 
permanent appropriation of the right of access 
to his lot, and recover as damages the consequent 
depreciation in value of the lot. 
-7-
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Consequently, the court affirmed a directed verdict in 
favor of the defendant. This rule accords the general rule 
followed throughout the United States as exemplified in the 
case of Power Farms, Inc. v. Consolidated Irrigation District, 
119 P.2d 717 (Cal. 1941). The Respondent's Brief makes 
assertion that this case related to an injury that occurred 
at one time. The facts of the case clearly indicate, how-
ever, that this was a case involving property damage which 
had occurred through water seeping over a 2-year period. 
This rule also accords with the rule stated in 54 
C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, §173: 
Ordinarily limitations as to a cause of 
action for damages caused by percolation or 
seepage of water or oil run from the date of 
the injury for which suit is brought or from 
the date on which injury becomes apparent or 
discoverable by due diligence. 
Most significant, however, is the fact that this case 
was not tried upon the theory that the plaintiff could only 
recover damages which had occurred in the 90 days previous 
to the filing of the claim. Since the trial court ruled 
that the claim need not be filed until the cause of the 
damages was discovered and that the cause of the damages was 
not discovered, as a matter of law, until August of 1974, no 
evidence was presented as to what amount of damages occurred 
during this period. Mr. Lynn Jones, who visited the property 
a year earlier, testified that the damage that he could see 
-8-
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at that time could be repaired for $500 (Record, 123). He 
did not see the property any time in the 90 days previous to 
the filing of the notice of claim, however. Even at the 
time he did view the property and make the estimate of $500 
to caulk the cracks, he did not make an inspection in the 
drainage pipe or under the foundation to determine whether 
such erosion had taken place, that further supporting work 
needed to be done at that time. Because the ruling of the 
trial court made similar evidence irrelevant, no rebuttal 
to Mr. Jones' estimate was presented. Furthermore, no 
evidence was presented as to whether the nuisance was con-
tinuous or reoccurring. The plaintiff asserts in his brief 
that "the storm drain pipe is relatively dry and without 
water most of the time and is periodic in nature and usually 
only contains water when there is a rainstorm or inclement 
weather in Olympus Cove in the Holladay area." This is not 
supported by evidence, however, because there was no reason 
to establish this fact at the trial. 
If the court should find that the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover for the damages that accrued within the 90-day 
period previous to the filing of the claim, these issues 
would have to be resubmitted to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
If the plaintiff can produce evidence that Salt Lake 
County was guilty of concealment or misrepresentation which 
-9-
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was the cause of plaintiff's failure to file his notice of 
claim under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, then Salt 
Lake County is clearly barred from asserting this defense. 
No such evidence was presented at trial, however. 
Conversely, there is no issue which can be legitimately 
submitted to a jury as to whether Salt Lake County is estopped 
to assert the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
The Utah case law, and the case law in the United 
States generally, holds that the cause of action runs from 
the time the damage has occurred and the claim is totally 
barred after the statutory period expires. Even if this 
Court were to hold, however, that the plaintiff could recover 
for the damages which occurred in the 90 days previous to 
the filing of the claim, there is no evidence, at this 
point, on which the court could make a determination as to 
how much damages had occurred. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of ~r~y 
1978. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By s~~ 
Scott Daniels 
-10-
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